Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia: Why Pakistan, Iran and the Global Oil Market Are Now Involved
The renewed Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia are rapidly turning Yemen's long-running conflict into something much larger.
Missiles and drones have struck Saudi cities and energy infrastructure. Riyadh has responded with air strikes inside Yemen. Pakistan has stepped into the crisis diplomatically, warning Iran that continued attacks could have wider consequences under Islamabad's defence arrangement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. Meanwhile, oil prices have climbed above $100 a barrel as markets confront simultaneous security threats around the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz.
The danger is no longer simply another round of fighting between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis.
It is the possibility that Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the world's most important energy routes are becoming connected parts of the same regional confrontation.
What Happened in Saudi Arabia?
On September 8, Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis launched one of their biggest attacks on Saudi Arabia in years.
Saudi authorities said 73 people were wounded, including women and children, after attacks across the southern cities of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan and Najran.
The Houthis said ballistic missiles and drones were used to target Saudi Aramco facilities in Abha, Najran and Jazan as well as an airbase at Khamis Mushait.
Saudi Arabia's energy ministry confirmed that attacks affected several energy facilities, causing fires and temporarily halting operations at some sites.
The Saudi-led coalition described the escalation as dangerous and promised a firm response.
Houthi Attacks on Saudi Arabia: Why Has the Conflict Restarted?
For much of the period following the 2022 UN-brokered truce, direct Saudi-Houthi confrontation had fallen dramatically.
That relative calm is now breaking down.
The Houthis have been launching attacks toward Saudi Arabia since declaring a naval blockade against the kingdom in July, while Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have mounted offensives against Houthi positions inside Yemen.
The confrontation is also increasingly connected to the broader Iran-US conflict.
That matters because Iran is the Houthis' principal external military supporter, although Tehran says it does not control the movement.
The result is a dangerous overlap between two conflicts:
Saudi Arabia ↔ Houthis
and
United States ↔ Iran
The risk is that these cease functioning as separate theatres.
Saudi Arabia Strikes Back
Riyadh's reaction has been swift.
Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said on September 9 that Saudi aircraft had carried out 54 strikes across Yemeni provinces during the previous 12 hours. Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have also intensified ground operations.
The fighting has since moved closer to one of the world's most strategically important waterways.
On September 10, the Houthis seized the key Yemeni port of Mocha, expanding their position along the Red Sea coast. AP reported that the advance brought Houthi forces to within roughly 80 kilometres of Bab el-Mandeb.
That changes the strategic picture.
Bab el-Mandeb is not simply a Yemeni coastal area. It is the gateway connecting the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean with the Red Sea and ultimately the Suez Canal.
Why Pakistan Has Suddenly Entered the Crisis
One of the most significant developments has taken place far from Yemen.
Pakistan has become a diplomatic intermediary between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Reuters reported on September 9 that Islamabad delivered a Saudi message to Tehran urging Iran to use its influence to halt Houthi attacks on the kingdom.
Iran's response, according to a senior Iranian official cited by Reuters, was that Tehran does not control the Houthis.
But the Pakistani intervention is important because Islamabad is not a neutral outsider.
Pakistan has a close strategic relationship with Saudi Arabia and is part of a recently signed defence arrangement involving Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif warned that attacks spilling into Saudi territory could activate that security arrangement.
His message was unusually explicit: aggression against one member could be treated as aggression against all three.
What Is the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia-Turkiye Defence Arrangement?
The arrangement significantly raises the stakes.
The tripartite defence agreement was signed in August and is designed around collective deterrence. Pakistan's defence minister has said that an attack against one of the countries could be treated as aggression against all three.
However, that does not mean Pakistan has entered the Yemen war.
Reuters reported that Pakistani officials stressed that any potential military role would be limited to defending Saudi territory against external aggression. Islamabad is currently pursuing diplomacy and attempting to prevent the confrontation from reaching the point where Saudi Arabia requests a more active Pakistani role.
That distinction is critical.
Pakistan is involved diplomatically. Pakistan has not joined Saudi operations inside Yemen.
Why Pakistan Must Balance Saudi Arabia and Iran
Islamabad faces a difficult strategic calculation.
Saudi Arabia is one of Pakistan's closest Middle Eastern partners. Defence cooperation between the two countries stretches back decades.
But Pakistan also shares a long land border with Iran.
A direct confrontation with Tehran or an Iran-backed movement could therefore create serious security complications for Islamabad.
Pakistan's current strategy appears aimed at preventing exactly that outcome: reassure Saudi Arabia while simultaneously using its relationship with Iran to de-escalate the crisis.
This gives Islamabad an unusual role as both Saudi security partner and potential intermediary with Tehran.
Iran's Role: Does Tehran Control the Houthis?
This question sits at the centre of the crisis.
Iran provides significant military support to the Houthis, including assistance that has helped develop their missile and drone capabilities.
But the Houthis are an indigenous Yemeni movement with their own leadership and political interests.
Iran publicly denies controlling Houthi decisions.
Reuters reported an additional, more contentious claim: two Iranian sources said Tehran had encouraged the Houthis to attack Saudi Arabia and promised additional funding and weapons. Those claims have not been independently established and should be understood as attributed reporting rather than confirmed public policy.
This distinction matters.
Iran can possess considerable influence over the Houthis without necessarily exercising complete command and control over every Houthi operation.
Why Saudi Oil Infrastructure Matters
Saudi Arabia is one of the world's largest oil producers and exporters.
That means attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure are not merely a Saudi security problem.
They can become a global economic problem.
The September 8 strikes caused fires and operational interruptions at some energy facilities. Immediately after the Saudi energy ministry's announcement, Brent crude rose to around $98 a barrel.
The situation deteriorated further the following day.
Brent moved above $100 per barrel on September 9, its first move above that threshold in about six weeks, as the wider confrontation involving Iran, the United States and regional shipping intensified.
By September 10, Brent had climbed above $105 amid continued concerns about Gulf supply and maritime security.
The reason goes beyond the amount of oil physically lost in a single attack.
Markets are pricing the possibility of future disruption.
Two Chokepoints, One Oil Crisis: Why Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb Matter
Two Chokepoints, One Global Energy Crisis
This is perhaps the most important part of the story.
Two of the world's critical maritime energy routes are simultaneously under pressure.
Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea.
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE depend to varying degrees on Gulf export routes.
The current US-Iran confrontation has already produced attacks on commercial vessels near Hormuz.
Bab el-Mandeb
Around 2,000 kilometres to the southwest lies Bab el-Mandeb.
It connects:
Indian Ocean → Gulf of Aden → Red Sea → Suez Canal → Mediterranean
Houthi control over much of western Yemen gives the movement the ability to threaten vessels approaching this route.
And their capture of Mocha has moved Houthi forces even closer to the strait.
This creates an extraordinary strategic problem:
Hormuz threatens access to Gulf energy supplies.
Bab el-Mandeb threatens the route carrying trade toward Suez and Europe.
Why Oil Has Crossed $100
Oil prices are responding to several risks at once.
The Houthis are attacking infrastructure belonging to the world's leading oil exporter.
Iran and the United States are engaged in a widening maritime confrontation.
Commercial shipping around Hormuz faces growing danger.
And Yemen's renewed war is moving closer to Bab el-Mandeb.
Reuters reported that Brent moved above $100 on September 9 as Iran said it had struck multiple vessels near Hormuz after the United States sank Iranian oil tankers. At the same time, Houthi attacks had left Saudi energy facilities burning.
The price therefore reflects not only today's supply losses but also a geopolitical risk premium: traders are paying more because they cannot confidently predict tomorrow's supply.
What Does This Mean for India?
For India, the consequences could be substantial even if no missile ever comes close to Indian territory.
India is a major importer of crude oil.
Higher international oil prices therefore increase the country's import bill and can eventually influence fuel costs, transport expenses and inflation.
There is also a shipping problem.
Indian exports heading toward Europe frequently use the route:
Arabian Sea → Gulf of Aden → Bab el-Mandeb → Red Sea → Suez Canal → Europe
If ships avoid the Red Sea because of Houthi attacks, they may instead travel around the Cape of Good Hope.
That adds distance, time and fuel consumption.
Insurance premiums can also rise.
So India faces two interconnected risks:
higher energy prices + more expensive international shipping.
Could Pakistan Actually Enter the Conflict?
This is the question that could dominate the next stage of the crisis.
The short answer is:
Possible, but not currently happening.
Pakistan's defence minister initially indicated that continuing attacks on Saudi territory could make the trilateral defence mechanism operational.
But Islamabad has subsequently adopted a more cautious public position. Reports on September 10 said Pakistan clarified that direct military action was not currently under discussion.
That makes diplomatic intervention far more likely in the immediate term than Pakistani forces entering Yemen.
Nevertheless, the defence agreement introduces a new variable.
If Houthi attacks continue to hit Saudi cities or critical infrastructure, Riyadh could demand greater assistance from its partners.
That would confront Pakistan with an exceptionally difficult decision: how far should it go in defending Saudi Arabia without becoming directly involved in a conflict linked to neighbouring Iran?
Is Yemen's Civil War Starting Again?
There is another danger beneath the international confrontation.
Yemen itself could return to full-scale war.
The large-scale Saudi-Houthi conflict had remained comparatively subdued since the 2022 truce.
That balance is deteriorating.
Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have launched new offensives. The Houthis have expanded along the Red Sea coast and captured Mocha. Saudi air strikes have resumed at significant scale.
AP describes Yemen as being at risk of sliding back into civil war after years of relative military stalemate.
A renewed Yemeni war would have consequences extending far beyond Yemen's borders because of the country's location beside Bab el-Mandeb.
What Happens Next?
There are three broad possibilities.
The first is de-escalation. Pakistan and other regional governments could help broker an arrangement in which Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia stop and Saudi strikes inside Yemen decline.
The second is contained escalation. Saudi Arabia and the Houthis could continue exchanging attacks while both avoid crossing thresholds that bring other countries directly into the conflict.
The third and most dangerous is regionalisation.
In that scenario, Houthi attacks intensify, Saudi Arabia invokes deeper security cooperation with Pakistan and Türkiye, Iran increases its support for the Houthis, and maritime conflict expands simultaneously around Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz.
That would transform Yemen from a regional civil war into another front in a much broader Middle Eastern confrontation.
And because Saudi oil infrastructure, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb sit at the centre of global energy networks, the consequences would not remain confined to the Middle East.
India, Europe and much of Asia would feel them through oil prices, freight costs and supply chains.
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UPDATED+ EDITORIAL NOTE
This is a rapidly developing conflict. Updated+ distinguishes verified developments from claims made by governments and armed groups. Casualty figures, military operations and allegations of Iranian coordination should be updated as independently verified information becomes available.
